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Potential  customers of network commodities face coordination problems due to adoption externalities 
that give rise to multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. We investigate the extent to which the coordination 
problem can be resolved by inducement schemes when agents’ preferences are private information. 
Specifically, we show that all symmetric “cut-off strategy” profiles (agents adopt if and only if their 
type is below a threshold) constitute the set of profiles that can be implemented as a unique equilibrium 
under an inducement scheme. We derive the ex ante cost of implementing each such profile. 
Furthermore, we fully characterize the set of inducement schemes that I) implement each such profile 
and ii) have the following simple form: each scheme specifies a fixed fee that every adopter pays, and a 
fixed gross subsidy/prize to be randomly allocated to (or evenly split among) the adopters. We discuss 
the implications of these findings on the design of optimal schemes for different network organizers, 
namely, private entrepreneurs and public entities. 
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Adoption externalities are inherent in network industries where the utility of con-
sumers from a good/service is positively correlated with the number of other agents who
consume the same commodity. In particular, adoption externalities are prominent for com-
modities that are intrinsically designed for joint consumption or sharing (telephony and
data networks), and those that enjoy indirect scale economies for complementary goods
(hardware-software and durable-good servicing). They also occur in the diﬀusion of inno-
vations and standards where compatibility is valuable.
An agent’s decision whether to consume/adopt a network commodity critically de-
pends on his belief regarding how many other agents will adopt it. Since positive beliefs
lead to positive decisions and vice versa, there tend to be multiple equilibria that are
Pareto-ranked: at the worst end is a null equilibrium in which no one adopts because no
one is ever anticipated to adopt, while at the other end is a “maximum” equilibrium that
refers to a “maximal set of agents” who would indeed adopt when that is what everyone
expects. In addition, there may be other intermediate equilibria that are in between these
two in terms of both the set of adopters and Pareto criterion. With no outside force
present, the particular equilibrium to be realized is indeterminate, a phenomenon known
as coordination failure.
As Dybvig and Spatt (1983) clarify, two sorts of public good problems arise in such
environments. First, early adopters furnish a public good if the positive externalities they
generate launch a domino chain reaction of widespread adoption, possibly leading to the
maximum equilibrium. However, agents would be willing to adopt early only if they believe
that widespread adoption will follow, an outcome that is not guaranteed. Second, even
at the maximum equilibrium the adoption level is below the social optimum because each
individual agent’s adoption decision does not internalize its positive externality on other
adopters.
Dybvig and Spatt (1983) show that these two problems can be resolved by tax/subsidy
schemes by a government when the distribution of agents’ preferences is known. Specif-
ically, they describe a scheme that eﬀectively works as insurance to adopters against the
possibility that fewer agents adopt than in the maximum equilibrium. With this insurance
the maximum equilibrium is the unique equilibrium under their scheme (thereby resolving
the ﬁrst problem). This scheme, ingeniously, is costless ex post because the promise of
subsidy in unfortunate cases of low adoption ensures that agents adopt without worrying
about such cases, thereby preventing the occurrence of such cases. As a consequence, pay-
ment of the subsidy is never exercised. Designing such a scheme is possible because the
government knows the distribution of agents’ preferences and hence the number of adopters
in the maximum equilibrium, so that appropriate insurance can be speciﬁed precisely when
the number of adopters is less than, but not when it is equal to, the maximum equilibrium
level. They also provide a separate scheme based on the same logic that guarantees the
socially optimal level of adoption as the unique equilibrium (thereby resolving the second
problem). However, this scheme is not costless.
1In this paper we consider a related, but diﬀerent class of environments from that of
Dybvig and Spatt, in which the actual distribution of agents’ preferences is not known; in-
stead, it is common knowledge that every agent’s preference/type is privately drawn from
a publicly known distribution. Then, the actual distribution of agents’ types is stochas-
tic, hence the maximum equilibrium cannot be known because it depends on the actual
distribution of types. Therefore, it is not possible to provide insurance against only the
contingencies that fewer agents adopt than in the maximum equilibrium. Moreover, since
every agent adopts (does not adopt) when he draws a suﬃciently favorable (unfavorable)
type, the realized number of adopters can be any number with positive probability and
as a result, unlike in Dybvig and Spatt, a subsidy scheme cannot be costless ex post by
preventing the occurrence of contingencies that require subsidy payment. As such, the
mechanisms of Dybvig and Spatt do not extend to these environments.1
We investigate the extent to which the coordination problem can be resolved in this
environment by inducement schemes that only aﬀects adopters. Speciﬁcally, we show that
agents always use “cutoﬀ strategies” (adopt if and only if their type is below a threshold)
in equilibrium, and that every symmetric cutoﬀ strategy proﬁle can be implemented as the
unique equilibrium under some inducement scheme. For each symmetric cutoﬀ strategy
proﬁle, we derive the ex ante cost of implementing it as a unique equilibrium. If the agent’s
utility is quasi-linear then this cost is invariant to diﬀerent inducement schemes that may
implement it. Furthermore, we fully characterize the set of inducement schemes that i)
implement each such proﬁle and ii) have the following simple form: the schemes specify a
ﬁxed fee that every adopter pays, and a ﬁxed gross subsidy/prize that is randomly allocated
to (or evenly split among) the adopters. The basic intuition behind such schemes is that,
since a ﬁxed subsidy is randomly allocated, the fewer adopters there are, the larger is the
expected subsidy for each adopter. Hence, this scheme provides a suﬃciently high subsidy
per adopter to sustain momentum for further adoption, until the threshold type reaches
the target level.
These ﬁndings carry implications on the optimal schemes that network organizers
may desire to employ depending on their objectives. The aforementioned, ex ante cost of
implementing an equilibrium is the negative of ex ante proﬁt from the viewpoint of a private
entrepreneur. Hence, the optimal scheme for this entrepreneur is one that implements the
equilibrium with the lowest ex ante cost. We characterize the common cutoﬀ level of this
equilibrium as the solution to a simple maximization problem. This cutoﬀ level is lower
than, hence inferior to, in a social welfare sense, that of the maximum equilibrium in the
absence of inducement scheme. It may be worth noting that the inducement schemes of
the simple form described above exhibit some resemblance to the often-observed private
promotion schemes that award prizes to a ﬁxed number of ﬁrst-arrived subscribers.
1 In principle, one can conceive a preference revelation mechanism in which the agents report their
realized types to the organizer who then announces the Dybvig-Spatt incentive scheme conditional on the
reported type proﬁle. We think it is interesting, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, to examine
what can be done when such information collection is not possible.
2A public organizer may wish to overcome the coordination failure eﬃciently (i.e., at
minimum cost) by implementing a symmetric equilibrium at least as large as the maxi-
mum equilibrium in the absence of inducement scheme. Our results imply that an organizer
achieves this goal by implementing this maximum equilibrium in a budget-balanced man-
ner. Note that in spite of the obvious informational disadvantage of the organizer relative
to the model of Dybvig and Spatt, we still ﬁnd that the best equilibrium without induce-
ment can be achieved by a subsidy scheme that is (ex ante) costless. In this sense we
strengthen the scope of public intervention suggested by Dybvig and Spatt to remedy the
public good problems caused by adoption externalities, although the details of how it may
work diﬀer between their environment and ours. We also identify a symmetric social opti-
mum and show that an organizer can implement it, although the scheme that implements
it cannot be budget-balanced.
Among existing studies on markets with adoption externalities, a relatively small num-
ber investigate inducement schemes to tackle the problem of coordination failure. Before
the work of Dybvig and Spatt (1983) detailed above, Rohlfs (1974) considers introduc-
tory pricing in a classic paper on telecommunication markets. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)
study a refund mechanism in private contribution to a public project. Andreoni (1998)
examines large “leadership gifts” in charitable fund-raising. These papers analyze envi-
ronments with (almost) complete information, i.e., either the agents’ preferences or their
distribution are/is known. In a dynamic context of private contribution to a public project,
Gradstein (1992) mentions subsidization of early contributors by taxing later contributors
as a potential policy instrument to remedy ineﬃcient delay, but he is cautious about the
eﬀectiveness of this policy in the presence of incomplete information (of the kind considered
in this paper). However, he does not provide an analysis of such schemes.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Sections 2 and 3 present and
analyze the model without inducement schemes, highlighting the possibility of coordination
failure due to adoption externalities. Section 4 presents our main ﬁndings on inducement
schemes that resolve such problems. Section 5 discusses the implications of the ﬁndings
on the network organizers depending on their objectives.
2. Model
There are N+1 ex ante identical agents who i) privately and independently observe
their types t  0 drawn from a common density function f : <+ ! <+, and then ii)
simultaneously choose either to adopt the network product or not. We assume that the
cdf F : <+ ! [0;1] associated with f is continuous (i.e., t is atomless). For expositional
convenience only, we assume F(t) < 1 for all t < 1 and f(t) > 0 for all t > 0.
The payoﬀ to an adopter is determined by his type t and the size of the network
formed, measured by the number n of other adopters (i.e., not counting himself): A t-type
adopter derives a utility of vt(n) 2 < when there are n other adopters, where vt(n) is a
strictly increasing function of n = 0;;N. The payoﬀ to a non-adopter is normalized to
0. Each agent makes an adoption decision to maximize the expected payoﬀ vt of his type.
3An agent’s type measures how reluctant he is to join the network, so a higher type
means a more conservative agent who needs a larger network to beneﬁt by joining. Hence,
it is natural to assume that vt(n) is decreasing in t, i.e.,
s < t ) vs(n) > vt(n) 8n = 0;;N: (1)
Speciﬁcally, we use the following measurement2: a t-type agent for t  N is indiﬀerent
between adopting and not if all other agents adopt with probability t













> 0 if t
N < p  1
= 0 if p = t
N
< 0 if 0  p < t
N
(2)
Here E[vt(n)jp] is the expected utility of a t-type adopter when all others adopt with a
probability p: note that this increases strictly in p because the binomial distribution of the
number n of adopters for a higher p ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that for a lower p
and vt is strictly increasing in n. Hence, if the equality of (2) for the case p = t
N holds,
then so do the inequalities for t
N < p  1 and 0  p < t
N. A natural interpretation of an
agent’s type, t, is the threshold network size above which he is willing to join, in the sense
that t = t
N  N is the expected number of other adopters when p = t
N. We note that the
payoﬀ functions vt(n) that satisfy (1) and (2) are necessarily continuous in t 2 [0;N] for
each given n, as is proved in the Appendix. For expositional convenience, we assume that
vt(n) is continuous at all t  0 (our basic results are robust to this assumption). A simple
example that satisﬁes (1) and (2) is vt(n) = n  t.
An agent i’s strategy is an integrable function (relative to f) that maps types to
adoption probabilities, i.e.,
i : <+ ! [0;1]
where i(t) is the probability that the agent i adopts (the network product) when his type
is t. A cutoﬀ strategy (at ˆ t) refers to i such that i(t) = 1 if t < ˆ t and i(t) = 0 if t > ˆ t
for some cutoﬀ level ˆ t  0.
3. Equilibria Without Inducements
In this section we characterize the (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of the Bayesian adop-
tion game described above, which is a strategy proﬁle of N+1 agents each of whose decision
is a best response contingent upon his own type.
Lemma 1: Every agent uses a cutoﬀ strategy in equilibrium.
2 This is without loss of generality (due to rescaling) so long as no type of agent derives positive utility
when he is the sole adopter. This is a natural presumption. Moreover, our basic results are robust to this
presumption.
4Proof: Each agent i adopts with a probability pi =
R
i(t)dF where i is the equilib-
rium strategy of agent i. Fix an arbitrary agent, say agent j. The distribution Dj on the
number n of other agents who adopt is determined by pi’s, i 6= j. By (1), we deduce that
Ej[vt(n)] strictly decreases in t where the expectation is taken relative to Dj. Hence, the
claim follows since j(t) = 1 if Ej[vt(n)] > 0 and j(t) = 0 if Ej[vt(n)] < 0.
Lemma 2: All agents use the same cutoﬀ strategy in equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 1 let ˆ ti  0 be the cutoﬀ level of agent i, so he adopts with
probability pi = F(ˆ ti). Suppose, contrary to the claim, that two agents j and k have
diﬀerent cutoﬀ levels, say ˆ tj < ˆ tk. Let Di denote the distribution on the number n
of adopters except the agent i: Di is determined by the probabilities that other agents
adopt. Note that Dj ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Dk because pj < pk. It follows,
therefore, that Ej[vt(n)] > Ek[vt(n)] for every t, hence for ˆ tj < t < ˆ tk in particular, where
Ei[vt(n)] is the expected value of vt(n) relative to Di. But, this is impossible because
ˆ tj < ˆ tk implies that Ej[vt(n)] < 0 and Ek[vt(n)] > 0 for ˆ tj < t < ˆ tk.
By virtue of Lemma 2 we represent an equilibrium by a common cutoﬀ level ˆ t: an
agent prefers to adopt precisely when his type is below ˆ t, given that all other agents adopt
precisely when their types are below ˆ t. Since vt(n) is continuous in t, this is the case
if a ˆ t-type agent is indiﬀerent between adopting and not. That is, a cutoﬀ level ˆ t is an
equilibrium one if and only if
V (ˆ t) := E[vˆ t(n)jp = F(ˆ t)] = 0: (3)
Since V (0) = 0 by (2), ˆ t = 0 is an equilibrium cutoﬀ level which depicts the “no-
coordination” equilibrium in which no agent adopts precisely because the belief that no
one would ever adopt is self-fulﬁlling. On the other hand, for all ˆ t  N we have V (ˆ t) <
E[vˆ t(n)jp = 1] < E[vN(n)jp = 1] = 0 where the ﬁrst and second inequalities follow from
F(ˆ t) < 1 and (1), respectively, and the ﬁnal equality follows from (2). This means that no
ˆ t  N can be an equilibrium cutoﬀ level because such types would not adopt even if all
other agents adopt with certainty. Since vt is continuous so is V (t) and, therefore, there is
a maximum type, denoted by t < N, such that V (t) = 0, hence V (ˆ t) < 0 for all ˆ t > t.
We refer to t as the maximum equilibrium (cutoﬀ level) without inducement scheme.
We say that a cutoﬀ level t is “under expansion (contraction) pressure” if V (t) > 0
(V (t) < 0) in the sense that if all agents are believed to use the same cutoﬀ strategy at
level t, all of them would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to increase (decrease) their own cutoﬀ levels. A
typical coordination problem with adoption externalities is that a pessimistic anticipation
of adoption rate (i.e., short of the “critical mass”) is reinforced by contraction pressure
toward an even lower adoption rate, although once the anticipation is pushed beyond
the critical mass for some reason the expansion pressure would be self-reinforcing until the
network grows to the maximum size. Since we are interested in identifying possible schemes
that would overcome such coordination problems, below we consider environments that are
5subject to such problems. Our analysis and ﬁndings apply more generally, however it may
be expositional useful to focus on situations in which there is a type tm strictly between 0
and t such that
i)V (tm) = 0; ii)V (t) < 0 for all t 2 (0;tm); and iii)V (t) > 0 for all t 2 (tm;t): (4)
Here, tm represents the critical mass in the sense that if agents believe that all other agents
use cutoﬀ strategies at levels tm or above (some strictly above), then the expansion pressure
continues to increase the agents’ cutoﬀ levels all the way up to t, i.e., to the maximum
equilibrium. On the other hand, there are two other equilibria with lesser degrees of
coordination, one in which the equilibrium cutoﬀ level is tm and the other in which no one
ever adopts.
As a simple example, note that (4) is satisﬁed for all large N when vt(n) = nt and
f is single-peaked with f(0) = 0. In this case V (t) is strictly convex for lower values of t
and is strictly concave for higher value of t, with three equilibrium cutoﬀ levels, namely,
0, tm and t, as illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
4. Inducement Schemes
An inducement scheme is a rule that assigns a lottery (a probability distribution of
monetary transfers) to each agent contingent on the observable outcome of the adoption
game, i.e., on the set of adopters. Since all agents are identical for an organizer at the
point in time that the organizer sets an inducement scheme, it is natural to consider
inducements schemes that are “anonymous” in the sense that the lottery assignment rules
do not distinguish agents with identical observable characteristics.3 Following Dybvig and
Spatt (1983), we postulate that an agent of type t tries to maximize the expected value of
a quasi-linear utility function vt(n)+s where vt(n) is the utility from adopting the network
as described earlier and s is the net transfer/subsidy to him according to the inducement
scheme in place.
The quasi-linear speciﬁcation implies that the agents are only concerned about the
expected value of the lotteries (i.e., not about the precise distributions of the prizes)
assigned by an inducement scheme. The organizer is concerned about the ex ante running
cost of a scheme, hence what matters to the organizer is also the expected values of the
lotteries. Therefore, we may represent a general (anonymous inducement) scheme by a
function sA : f0;;N +1g ! < where sA() is the net expected monetary transfer to
each adopter when the number of all adopters is  2 f0;;N + 1g. (Note that we
do not consider monetary transfers to/from non-adopters, because any such transfer that
may facilitate adoption would be taxing the non-adopters which is infeasible for organizers
3 Dybvig and Spatt (1983) also consider anonymous inducement schemes.
6without taxing authority; even if feasible, it would be unpopular as a public policy, as well
as unrealistic.)
An equilibrium under a scheme sA is an equilibrium of the Bayesian adoption game
when all the agents know that the scheme sA is in place. It is straightforward to verify
that Lemma 1 still holds for equilibria under a scheme sA, hence every agent uses a cutoﬀ
strategy.
If an inducement scheme is in place Lemma 2 may not hold generally and equilibria
may exist in which agents use diﬀerent cutoﬀ strategies: an agent could have a higher cutoﬀ
level than another because the lower expected utility (from network good) of the former is
exactly cancelled oﬀ by a higher expected net subsidy than the latter (both disparities due
to the former facing a “lower” distribution of the number of other adopters). We believe
that such equilibria are less focal than symmetric ones because they would require identical
agents to have diﬀerent beliefs that are delicately related to satisfy equilibrium conditions.
Achieving such asymmetric coordination would be an extreme coincidence especially be-
cause the identities of the agents holding diﬀerent beliefs within equilibrium are completely
arbitrary, hence there are many asymmetric equilibria that diﬀer only in artiﬁcial naming
of the agents. For these reasons, asymmetric equilibria would be particularly uncertain
and unattractive goals to target for an organizer using inducement schemes. Furthermore,
the above observation establishes that if there is a unique equilibrium under a scheme it
must be a symmetric one.
In the sequel, therefore, we will examine inducement schemes under which there is a
unique symmetric equilibrium, say with a common cutoﬀ level ˆ t. By the same reasoning
as that leading to the equilibrium characterization (3), ˆ t is a symmetric equilibrium cutoﬀ
level under sA if and only if
V (ˆ t) + E[sA()jp = F(ˆ t)] = 0 (5)
where E[sA()jp = F(ˆ t)] is the expected value of sA() for an agent when he adopts given
that all other agents adopt with probability F(ˆ t).
Lemma 3: If ˆ t is the common cutoﬀ level of a symmetric equilibrium under a scheme








F(ˆ t)(1  F(ˆ t))N+1sA() = (N + 1)F(ˆ t)V (ˆ t): (6)
Proof: By deﬁnition,
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= (N + 1)F(ˆ t)E[sA()jp = F(ˆ t)]
= (N + 1)F(ˆ t)V (ˆ t):
(8)
Here, the second equality is obtained by factoring out (N +1)F(ˆ t), the third one by change
of variables (i.e., n =   1), and the last two follow from (7) and (5), respectively.
This lemma speciﬁes the expected total net transfer to the agents, C(ˆ t), in case there
is a scheme sA under which the symmetric cutoﬀ strategies at ˆ t constitute an equilibrium.
Note that it is independent of sA: a net transfer of V (ˆ t) for each adopter is required for
a ˆ t-type agent to be the marginal type to adopt, and each agent incurs this cost with a
probability F(ˆ t), hence the right hand side of (6).
We now show that for any ˆ t > 0 there indeed exists a scheme sA under which the
symmetric cutoﬀ strategies at ˆ t constitute a unique symmetric equilibrium: in this case
we say that sA implements a symmetric equilibrium at cutoﬀ level ˆ t (or, implements a
common cutoﬀ level ˆ t, for short). In particular, we identify such schemes that have the
following simple form: The organizer sets a fee T  0 that every adopter pays and a total
subsidy/prize S  0 that is randomly allotted to one adopter (splitting S evenly among all
adopters has the same eﬀect due to quasi-linear speciﬁcation). This scheme is represented
by sA() = (S=)T for  > 0 and sA(0) = 0. For notational simplicity, however, we use
(S;T) as shorthand for such a scheme.








F(t)n(1  F(t))Nn 1
n + 1
(9)
denote the probability that an adopter “wins” (i.e., gets allotted) the prize S given that
all other agents adopt precisely when their type is below t, so that the expected subsidy
amount is PA(t)  S and, therefore, the expected overall surplus of a t-type adopter under
(S;T) is
W(tjS;T) := V (t) + PA(t)  S  T: (10)
Note that W(ˆ tjS;T) = 0 is the condition (5) for ˆ t to be a symmetric equilibrium cutoﬀ
level under (S;T). If (S;T) implements a common cutoﬀ level ˆ t, therefore, W(ˆ tjS;T) = 0
and W(tjS;T) 6= 0 for all t 6= ˆ t.
8Given ˆ t > 0, for any S > 0 one can choose T to ensure W(ˆ tjS;T) = 0, i.e., T =
V (ˆ t)+PA(ˆ t)S. Since PA(t) is decreasing in t, the higher S is the more rapidly decreasing
is the part PA(t)  S  T of (10) in t. Note that V (t) is bounded on the closed interval
[0;ˆ t]. With T varying to maintain W(ˆ tjS;T) = 0, therefore, one can ﬁnd a lower bound,
say S
0, such that if S > S
0 then PA(t)  S  T exceeds V (t), i.e., W(tjS;T) > 0, for all
0  t  ˆ t.4 Furthermore, since V (t) is bounded above for t > ˆ t, there is a lower bound, say
S
00, such that if S > S
00 then PA(t)S +T exceeds V (t), i.e., W(tjS;T) < 0, for all t > ˆ t.
Hence, ˆ t is a unique symmetric equilibrium cutoﬀ level under (S;T) if S > maxfS
0;S
00g.
This result is formalized in the next theorem.
Theorem 1: For any ˆ t > 0 there is a lower bound S(ˆ t)  0 such that the scheme
(S;T) implements the symmetric equilibrium at cutoﬀ level ˆ t if and only if S > S(ˆ t) and
T = V (ˆ t) + PA(ˆ t)  S.
A proof is provided in the Appendix. Instead, we give a graphical illustration of the
level of S(ˆ t) when ˆ t = t in Figure 1. Given S > 0, the graph of PA(t)  S < 0 is
increasing in t. As S increases, the vertical distance from the horizontal axis to the graph
of PA(t)S < 0 increases proportionately, i.e., the graph moves downward and the slope
gets steeper. T = V (t) + PA(t)  S is represented by the vertical distance from V (t)
to PA(t)  S at t = t. The level of S(t) is one such that this distance from V (t) to
PA(t)  S(t) at t = t coincides with the shortest distance from V (t) to PA(t)  S(t)
for 0  t  tm, as illustrated in Figure 1. By shifting the graph of PA(t)  S upward by
T so that it goes through t, we get the graph of T  PA(t)  S. For S > S(t), note that
this graph lies below V (t) for 0  t < t, so that W(tjS;T) > 0. In the current case of
ˆ t = t, for all t > t this graph clearly lies above V (t) because V (t) < V (t) = 0, hence
W(tjS;T) < 0. For other cases where V (t) > V (ˆ t) for some t > ˆ t, one also needs to choose
S suﬃciently large to ensure that the graph of T  PA(t)  S lies above V (t) for all t > ˆ t.
Our discussion so far is based on an implicit presumption that if there are multiple
equilibria and only one of them is symmetric, the latter is the focal one that will be
realized. Although we believe that this is a plausible presumption as argued earlier, we
emphasize that our result is robust to this presumption. In particular, for suﬃciently
large S, the scheme (S;T) in Theorem 1 implements the common cutoﬀ level ˆ t as the
unique equilibrium, symmetric or not, under minor technical assumptions, as the next
result states.
Theorem 2: Suppose vt(n) is diﬀerentiable in t for each n, and is bounded, i.e.,
jvt(n)j < M for all t and n where M < 1. For any ˆ t > 0 there is a threshold S(ˆ t)  S(ˆ t)
such that, if S > S(ˆ t) and T = V (ˆ t)+PA(ˆ t)S, the unique equilibrium under the scheme
(S;T) is a symmetric one in which all agents use cutoﬀ strategies at ˆ t.
Proof: See Appendix.
4 For this conclusion it is also needed that V (t) is not decreasing at an “inﬁnite rate” at ˆ t, which is
proved in the Appendix.
95. Discussion
In the previous section we showed that the ex ante cost of inducing a symmetric
equilibrium with cutoﬀ level ˆ t, if possible under an inducement scheme, is C(ˆ t) in (6);
and we established existence of such schemes for every ˆ t > 0, by identifying a simple class
of schemes that implement this equilibrium. These ﬁndings carry some implications on
the optimal schemes that a network organizer may desire to employ depending on the
objectives.
5.1. Private Entrepreneur
For a business entrepreneur operating a network industry for proﬁt, the negative
of C(ˆ t) in Lemma 3, (N + 1)F(ˆ t)V (ˆ t), is the expected proﬁt when she implements the
symmetric equilibrium with cutoﬀ level ˆ t by a scheme. Hence, the maximum possible
proﬁt is (N + 1)F(t)V (t) where t 2 argmaxt0F(t)V (t). This maximum proﬁt can be
achieved by a simple scheme (S;T) with S > S(t) and T = V (t) + PA(t)  S. This
scheme has a natural interpretation: T is a uniform price charged to every customer and
S is a promotion prize that is allocated to one customer by lottery. Clearly, V (t) > 0.
Hence, t 2 (tm;t) in environments that satisfy (4). Summarizing, we have
Corollary 1: A network organizer maximizes ex ante proﬁt by implementing a com-
mon cutoﬀ level t that solves maxt0 F(t)V (t). t 2 (tm;t) and the maximum ex ante
proﬁt is (N + 1)F(t)V (t) > 0.
Note that there is a continuum of schemes (S;T) that achieve the maximum ex ante
proﬁt.5 This indeterminacy can be alleviated by some additional criteria that the en-
trepreneur may desire to meet. For instance, for credibility reasons the entrepreneur may
want to ensure that potential ex post loss is within a certain limit, say `. Since the scheme
would incur largest loss when only one agent adopts, if V (t)+(PA(t)1)S(t) > `,
then the entrepreneur can ensure this limit with (S;T) by selecting S suﬃciently close to
S(t). Otherwise, she cannot ensure this limit by a scheme of the simple form considered
in Theorem 1. Instead, she may look for a more complex scheme that reduces the loss in
case of low adoption (still satisfying (5) only when ˆ t = t), e.g., by oﬀering an appropriate
number of smaller prizes to be randomly allocated to adopters. This scheme more closely
resembles the often-observed promotion schemes that award prizes to a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrst-arrived subscribers.
5.2. Public Organizer
Sometimes public entities may promote network commodities, e.g., in such cases as
diﬀusion of innovations and standards. The internet was also sponsored initially by the
5 Technically, this multiplicity arises primarily because the agents are risk-neutral in monetary trans-
fers due to the quasi-linear speciﬁcation. If this risk-neutrality is relaxed, eﬃcient inducement schemes will
be more complex but still be based on the same basic principle of providing suﬃcient subsidy per adopter
when there are fewer adopters. In case the agents are risk-averse, an eﬃcient scheme sA() will be much
less sensitive to  than (S;T) is, to save in subsidy payments by reducing the agents’ risk.
10government. We consider two possible objectives that public entities may pursue as a
network organizer.
First, consider an organizer that is interested in the most eﬃcient (i.e., minimal cost)
ways to overcome the coordination failure by implementing a symmetric equilibrium with
cutoﬀ level at least t (i.e., at least as big as the maximum equilibrium in the absence of
inducement scheme). Since V (t) < 0 for t > t, Lemma 3 implies that the lower bound on
the ex ante cost of implementing a common cutoﬀ level t is 0, i.e., in a budget-balanced
manner; and implementing any larger common cutoﬀ level is more costly. Theorems 1 and
2 establish that the organizer can indeed implement t as the common cutoﬀ level (the
maximum equilibrium in the absence of inducement scheme) at a balanced budget.
Alternatively, an organizer may wish to implement the social optimum and want to
know the cost. To identify the social optimum, observe that an agent increases total social
welfare by adopting if the externality he exerts on others exceeds the utility loss to himself.
Since the utility loss increases with his type while the generated externality is independent
of it, all agents use a cutoﬀ strategy at social optimum. Given a symmetric strategy
proﬁle with a common cutoﬀ level ˆ t, the ex ante expected utility of an agent is EV (ˆ t) := R






F(ˆ t)n(1F(ˆ t))Nnvt(n) is the expected utility of
a t-type adopter. A social optimum is a common cutoﬀ level tso such that EV (tso)  EV (ˆ t)
for all ˆ t.6 It is clear that EV (ˆ t) < EV (t) if ˆ t < t because V (tjˆ t) < V (tjt) for all t < ˆ t
and V (tjt) > 0 for ˆ t < t < t. It is also clear that tso 6= t because a t-agent is indiﬀerent
between adopting and not when all others cutoﬀ at t, hence types in a neighborhood of
t should adopt when the externality is considered. Therefore, tso > t. We know from
the previous section that this social optimum can be implemented at an ex ante deﬁcit of
C(tso) = (N+1)F(tso)V (tso). These ﬁndings (summarized in the next corollary) extend
the scope of inducement schemes as a public means to overcome adoption externalities,
suggested by Dybvig and Spatt (1983), to situations where the organizer has incomplete
information on the distribution of customers’ preferences.
Corollary 2: A network organizer can implement the common cutoﬀ level t in an
ex ante budget-balanced manner: this is the least costly way of inducing a symmetric
equilibrium with cutoﬀ level t or higher. An organizer can implement the social optimum
cutoﬀ level, tso, at an ex ante deﬁcit of (N+1)F(tso)V (tso) > 0.
Finally, although we carried out the analysis in a static setting, the issue is intrinsically
dynamic and, therefore, extending the investigation to dynamic settings will be fruitful in
understanding the network-formation mechanism more fully. We are currently investigat-
ing the eﬀect on ﬁnal network size of having the number of agents already adopted available
6 In view of our argument earlier on the impracticability of implementing asymmetric strategy proﬁles
as equilibrium, we deﬁne social optimum among all symmetric strategy proﬁles. It is not obvious, although
tempting to conjecture, that a social optimum strategy proﬁle is necessarily symmetric, because spreads
in cutoﬀ levels can reduce the variance of ﬁnal network sizes by rendering extreme realizations less likely,
which could be beneﬁcial for some utility functions. One can show that this conjecture is true is when the
externality exhibits increasing returns to scale, i.e., vt(n + 1)  vt(n)  vt(n)  vt(n  1).
11as public information, when the agents have multiple chances to adopt.7
Appendix
Proof of continuity of vt(n): We prove our earlier assertion (in Section 2) that the payoﬀ
functions vt(n) that satisfy (1) and (2) are continuous in t 2 [0;N] for each given n =
0;;N. First, to show left-continuity, consider 0 < s  N. By deﬁnition, E[vs(n)jp =
(s  )=N ] = 0 for all  in a small interval [0;¯ ]. If vs(n) 6= limt"s vt(n) for some n,
then vs(n) < limt"s vt(n) because vt(n) is decreasing in t. Since the binomial probabilities N
n

pn(1  p)Nn is continuous in p for each n, such discontinuity of vt(n) would mean
that E[vs(n)jp = (s  )=N ], as a function of , is discontinuous at  = 0, contradicting
our earlier assertion that it is identically 0 for  2 [0;¯ ]. This establishes that vt(n) must
be left-continuous at all 0 < t  N for each n. An analogous argument establishes that
vt(n) must be right-continuous at all 0  t < N for each n, thereby proving the claim.
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix ˆ t > 0 and let L(ˆ t) := f0  t < ˆ tjV (t)  V (ˆ t)g. For each  2
L(ˆ t) let S
0() denote the unique value of S that solves (PA()PA(ˆ t))S+V ()V (ˆ t) = 0:
Since PA() is a decreasing function, S
0()  0 and (PA()PA(ˆ t))S+V ()V (ˆ t) > (<)0
if S > (<)S
0(). Deﬁne S
0 := sup2L(ˆ t) S
0(). Let S
0 = 0 if L(ˆ t) = ;.
We now show that S
0 is ﬁnite. This is trivial if ˆ t is not a limit point of L(ˆ t), because
then PA()PA(ˆ t) > 0 is bounded away from 0 and V ()V (ˆ t) is bounded for all  2 L(ˆ t).
Suppose ˆ t is a limit point of L(ˆ t). Note that f(ˆ t) > 0 for ˆ t > 0 by assumption.8 Hence,












F(t)n(1  F(t))Nnvt(n) increases is bounded, i.e.,
V (ˆ t)V (t)
ˆ tt < K for
some K > 0 in a small neighborhood of ˆ t. Hence, S
0() =
V (ˆ t)V ()
PA()PA(ˆ t) is bounded above
for all  2 L() in a small neighborhood of ˆ t and, therefore, S
0 is ﬁnite.
By construction of S
0, we have
i) If S > S
0, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) > 0 for all t 2 L(ˆ t);
ii) If S = S
0, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) > 0 for all t 2 L(ˆ t) if and only if
S
0 = limt"ˆ t S
0(t) > S
0(t0) for all t0 < ˆ t;
7 Existing studies of dynamic coordination problems include Rohlfs (1974) on telecommunication
markets, Farrell and Saloner (1985) on diﬀusion of new standards, Gale (1995) on investments with strategic
complementarities, and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Gradstein (1992) and Marx and Matthews (2000) on
private provision of funds to a public project.
8 S0 can be proved ﬁnite even if f(ˆ t) = 0 so long as there does not exist a sequence ftkg converging to
ˆ t such that limk!1
v^ t(n)vtk(n)
ˆ ttn
= 0 for all n = 0;;N, because then ˆ t cannot be a limit point of L(ˆ t).
It is straightforward to prove that this condition is satisﬁed at all ˆ t 2 [0;N] for vt(n) that satisfy (1) and
(2); For t > N, being a strictly decreasing function, vt(n) fails to have a strictly negative derivative, hence
fails to satisfy this condition, only in a set of measure zero. Without the assumption f(ˆ t) > 0, therefore,
S0 can still be proved to be ﬁnite, hence Theorem 1, for all 0 < ˆ t  N and for generic ˆ t > N.
12iii) If 0 < S < S
0, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) < 0 for some t 2 L(ˆ t);
iv) (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) > 0 for all t < ˆ t such that t 62 L(ˆ t).
Analogously, let U(ˆ t) := ft > ˆ tjV (t)  V (ˆ t)g. For each  2 U(ˆ t) let S
00() be
the unique value of S that solves (PA()  PA(ˆ t))  S + V ()  V (ˆ t) = 0: Since PA()
is a decreasing function, S
00()  0 and (PA()  PA(ˆ t))  S + V ()  V (ˆ t) < (>)0 if
S > (<)S
00(). Deﬁne S
00 := sup2U(ˆ t) S
00(). Let S
00 = 0 if U(ˆ t) = ;. It can be shown
that S
00 is ﬁnite in a manner analogous to before. Again, by construction,
v) If S > S
00, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) < 0 for all t 2 U(ˆ t);
vi) If S = S
00, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) < 0 for all t 2 U(ˆ t) if and only if
S
00 = limt#ˆ t S
00(t) > S
00(t0) for all t0 > ˆ t;
vii) If S < S
00, then (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) > 0 for some t 2 U(ˆ t);
viii) (PA(t)  PA(ˆ t))  S + V (t)  V (ˆ t) < 0 for all t > ˆ t such that t 62 U(ˆ t).
Deﬁne S(ˆ t) := maxfS
0;S
00g. It follows from i), iv), v) and viii) that if S > S(ˆ t) then
W(tjS;T)> 0 for all t < ˆ t, W(ˆ tjS;T) = 0, and W(tjS;T) < 0 for all t > ˆ t, establishing the
“if” part of the claim.
To prove the converse, consider (S;T) with S  S(ˆ t). If L(ˆ t) 62 f;;[0;ˆ t)g, then by iii)
and iv) and the mean value theorem there is  2 [0;ˆ t) such that W(jS;T) = 0, i.e., another
symmetric equilibrium exists under (S;T). The same conclusion is obtained analogously
if U(ˆ t) 62 f;;(ˆ t;1)g. Therefore, for (S;T) to implement the symmetric equilibrium with
cutoﬀ level ˆ t when S  S(ˆ t), it is necessary that L(ˆ t) 2 f;;[0;ˆ t)g and U(ˆ t) 2 f;;(ˆ t;1)g.
We consider these possibilities below.
If L(ˆ t) = U(ˆ t) = ;, then S(ˆ t) = 0. Hence, S = 0 is the only possible value of S not
exceeding S(ˆ t). Then, T = 0 and we showed already that multiple symmetric equilibria
exist in this case.
If L(ˆ t) = [0;ˆ t), we must have W(tjS;T) < 0 for all t < ˆ t for unique implementation of
ˆ t: otherwise, another symmetric equilibrium exists due to iii) and the mean value theorem.
Since W(0jS;T) = S  T, this would imply S  T  0. Then, the null equilibrium would
be another symmetric equilibrium under (S;T).
Finally, consider the case L(ˆ t) = ; and U(ˆ t) = (ˆ t;1). For unique implementation of
ˆ t, W(tjS;T) > 0 should hold for all t > ˆ t: otherwise, another symmetric equilibrium exists
due to vii) and the mean value theorem. Then, another equilibrium exists in which every
agent adopts regardless of his type.9
Proof of Theorem 2: In light of Theorem 1, we only need to show that no asymmetric
equilibrium exists under (S;T) if S is suﬃciently large. Denote an asymmetric equilibrium,
if exists, by t = (t1;;tN+1) 2 <
N+1
+ where ti is the equilibrium cutoﬀ level of agent
i. Without loss of generality, assume t1    tN+1 and t1 < tN+1. First we derive
conditions that such equilibria must satisfy.
9 The cost of inducing this equilibrium, if possible, is large so that this equilibrium is neither proﬁt-
maximizing for an entrepreneur nor a social optimum.
13Let ti := (t1;;ti1;ti+1;;tN+1) 2 <N. Let Pi(t)  0 denote the probability
that agent i wins the prize S when he adopts, given that all other agents use the cutoﬀ
strategies represented by ti. Note that this probability does not depend on his own cutoﬀ
level ti. Speciﬁcally, Pi(t) :=
PN
n=0 Prob(njti) 1
n+1 where Prob(njti) is the probability
that n other agents adopt given their cutoﬀ strategies ti. The expected utility of agent
i when he is of type ti and adopts, given ti, is V i(t) :=
PN
n=0 Prob(njti)vti(n); the
expected net transfer to him is Pi(t)S  T = (Pi(t)  PA(ˆ t))S  V (ˆ t). For t to be an
equilibrium under (S;T), therefore,
V i(t)  V (ˆ t) + (Pi(t)  PA(ˆ t))S = 0 8 i = 1;;N + 1: (11)
Next we show that asymmetric equilibrium does not exist under (S;T) if S is suﬃ-
ciently large. To reach a contradiction, suppose to the contrary that for a sequence fSkg
with limk!1 Sk = 1, asymmetric equilibrium t(Sk) = (t1(Sk);;tN+1(Sk)) exists under
(Sk;Tk) for each k where Tk = V (ˆ t) + PA(ˆ t)  Sk. By taking a subsequence if necessary,
assume without loss of generality that limk!1 ti(Sk) 2 <+ [f1g for all i = 1;;N +1.
Since vt is bounded so is V i(t). For (11) to hold for all Sk, therefore, we need
limk!1 Pi(t(Sk)) = PA(ˆ t) for all i. This is possible only if limk!1 ti(Sk) = ˆ t for all i, i.e.,
limk!1 t(Sk) = ˆ t := (ˆ t;;ˆ t) 2 <N+1. To see this, note that if limk!1 t1(Sk) 6= ˆ t, then
i) limk!1 t1(Sk) < ˆ t for otherwise limk!1 P1(t(Sk)) < PA(limk!1 t1(Sk)) < PA(ˆ t);
ii) limk!1 tN+1(Sk) > ˆ t for otherwise limk!1 PN+1(t(Sk)) > PA(ˆ t) would follow be-
cause limk!1 t1(Sk) < ˆ t and limk!1 tj(Sk)  ˆ t for all j 6= 1.
This would mean that P1(t(Sk))PN+1(t(Sk)) is bounded away from 0, so that it would
not be possible for both P1(t(Sk)) and PN+1(t(Sk)) to converge to PA(ˆ t) as required.
Hence, we conclude that t1(Sk) should converge to ˆ t, and analogously, so should tN+1(Sk).
Consequently, t(Sk) should converge to ˆ t. Now we show that this is impossible.
Since V 1(t(Sk)) > V N+1(t(Sk)), (11) implies

V i(t(Sk))  V (ˆ t)
Πi(t(Sk))
= Sk 8 k (12)
where Πi(t) := Pi(t)  PA(ˆ t). Deﬁne V : <N+1 ! <N+1 and Π : <N+1 ! <N+1 as
V(t) := (V 1(t)  V (ˆ t);;V N+1(t)  V (ˆ t)) and Π(t) := (Π1(t);;ΠN+1(t)). Since
vt(n) and F are diﬀerentiable in t by assumption, so are V and Π. Let DV(ˆ t) and DΠ(ˆ t)
denote the derivative of V and Π, respectively, evaluated at ˆ t: these are (N +1)(N +1)
Jacobian matrices of V and Π, respectively, evaluated at ˆ t. Note that V(ˆ t) = 0 by
deﬁnition and Π(ˆ t) = 0 by construction. Hence, according to the deﬁnition of derivative
(see, e.g., Spivak (1965) p.16),
V(t(Sk)) = DV(ˆ t)  (t(Sk) ˆ t) + oV (t(Sk) ˆ t) and
Π(t(Sk)) = DΠ(ˆ t)  (t(Sk) ˆ t) + oΠ(t(Sk) ˆ t)
where oV : <N+1 ! <N+1 and oΠ : <N+1 ! <N+1 are two “negligible” functions such
that
joV (t)j
jtj ! 0 as jtj ! 0 and similarly for oΠ. (Here, jtj is the usual norm of <N+1.)
14Note that DΠ(ˆ t) is a symmetric square matrix with 0 as its diagonal elements and
 < 0 as oﬀ-diagonal elements where  is the derivative of Pi(ˆ t) with respect to tj for j 6= i,
i.e., the marginal eﬀect on the probability that agent i wins the prize (if he adopts) when
an agent j 6= i increases his cutoﬀ level from ˆ t. As such, DΠ(ˆ t) is clearly nonsingular,
i.e., it represents a linear transformation of <N+1 that is one-to-one and onto.10 Hence,
jDΠ(ˆ t)(t(Sk)ˆ t)j  jt(Sk)ˆ tj where  := minftjjtj=1g jDΠ(ˆ t)tj=jtj is strictly positive
because DΠ(ˆ t) is nonsingular. DV(ˆ t) also represents a linear transformation of <N+1 (not
necessarily onto), hence jDV(ˆ t)(t(Sk)ˆ t)j  Θjt(Sk)ˆ tj where Θ := maxftjjtj=1g jDV(ˆ t)







jDV(ˆ t)(t(Sk)ˆ t)+oV (t(Sk)ˆ t)j
jt(Sk)ˆ tj












This is a contradiction to (12) because (12) implies that V(t(Sk)) = SkΠ(t(Sk)) and,
therefore, limk!1 jV(t(Sk))j=jΠ(t(Sk))j = 1. This contradiction establishes that asym-
metric equilibrium does not exist under (S;T) if S is suﬃciently large.
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